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Most legal systems, common or civil, religious or customary, are
haunted by the archetypal specter of the innocent man suffering
punishment for a crime he did not commit, particularly if the man had
somehow condemned himself by his own mouth. We give forth a
collective shudder at the prospect, regardless of the unlikelihood of such
an eventuality.' It is for this reason that nearly all legal systems have
erected some sort of procedural bulwark against the nightmarish results of
coerced self-incrimination, spanning the spectrum from per se exclusion
to corroborative independent evidence requirements.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Each of the major western European jurisdictions and their progeny
recognize some form of protection against compelled self-incrimination.2
The earliest European rules concerning self-incrimination evolved from the
Roman Law and were continued in its Canon Law successor. Under
Canon Law, if an accused "contumaciously refused" to answer, such
refusal was viewed as a confession to the truth of the matter in question.3
From this common root, the civil and common law diverged.
* Judge Advocate, United States Air Force. The author wishes to thank Professor
James Feinerman of the Georgetown University Law Center for his guidance in the
research and writing of this article.
1. But see When Justice Isn't Done, ECONOMIST, Oct. 28, 1989, at 16 (detailing the
repeated and systematic coercion of false confessions by the now-defunct West Midlands
Serious Crimes Squad in northern England).
2. See Manfred Pieck, The Accused's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in the Civil
Law, 11 AM. J. CoMP. L. 585 (1962).
3. ROBERT B. CLUNE, THE JUDICIAL INTERROGATION OF THE PARTIES 14 (Catholic
University Canon Law Series No. 269, 1948).
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A. Civil Law
In codified civil law jurisdictions, generally based on the 1808 Code
d'Instruction Criminelle of France, some form of privilege against self-
incrimination emerged. The purpose of this privilege was not, as we shall
see in the common law, to prevent untrustworthy statements by an
accused, but rather to secure the physical and psychological integrity of
the accused's person from intimidation, coercion, or torture. Indeed,
even today the accused is not generally informed of his right against self-
incrimination until he is formally charged. In Germany and the
Netherlands, a suspect is often "tricked" into confessing because there is
no requirement to inform him of this right.' In France, where the police
and prosecutors are given great latitude in determining when a suspect will
be charged, formal accusation is often delayed to deliberately keep the
suspect ignorant of his rights.6 Some civilian jurisdictions statutorily
address the admissibility of coerced self-incriminating statements, for
example, Germany, France, and the former-Yugoslavia; but many do not.7
B. Common Law
On the matter of self-incrimination, the common law languished in a
kind of schizophrenia until the English Civil War. During the 15th
century, English courts did not compel testimony by oath or torture, but
the accused was subject to compulsory pre-trial interrogation by a
magistrate.' This interrogation was conducted without counsel and any
resulting statements were admissible at trial.9 Before that time, the
English "common law" courts would conduct ajudicial examination of the
accused without oath at the commencement of each trial."o
4. Pieck, supra note 2, at 589-91.
5. Id. at 601.
6. Id.
7. Mirjan Dama~ka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 522 (1973).
8. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT No.1, REPORT
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION, at 90 (1986)
[hereinafter REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL].
9. Id.
10. Id.; see also J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 580-
81 (3d ed. 1990). The accused was required, however, to request a jury trial. When
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Contemporaneously, the English "ecclesiastical" courts compelled
testimony through the oath ex officio, with attendant punishment for
refusal to either answer truthfully or to take the oath.11 After the
Restoration, the practice of examining the accused was eliminated.1 2 In
fact, an accused was regarded as incompetent to testify as a witness at his
own trial, presumably to prevent him from perjuring himself, although a
confession could still be admitted in evidence."
What has developed between the modem common and civil law is a
substantive consensus but a procedural schism. The consensus that
emerged is a general agreement concerning the use of self-incriminating
statements, yet two vastly different procedural schemata for dealing with
such statements.
The core of this protection in almost all systems is the desire to
prevent investigation or adjudication procedures from coercing
unreliable confessions from the mouths of the accused persons.
It is not the desire to prevent investigators from asking accused
or suspected persons questions relating to the crime, nor the
desire to keep the person from answering them . . . nor the
desire to keep people from drawing adverse inferences from an
accused person's refusal to answer questions. 4
pleading "not guilty," the accused was asked how he wished to be tried-the only viable
answer being "by God and the country." If the accused refused to request a jury trial,
he was to be kept confined, in accordance with the 1275 Statute of Westminster, in prison
forte et dure (confined under harsh conditions and on a "meagre diet"). Id. at 580. By
some "grisly misunderstanding," the word prison was misread (or misapplied) as peine
(pain) with the result that a prisoner who refused to request a jury would be pressed under
heavy weights until he either made the request or died. Id. This practice continued apace
for several centuries, with the last known incident of peine forte et dure occuring in
Cambridgeshire in 1741. Id. After which, the abolition of this procedure, a refusal to
plead resulted in an immediate conviction. Id. Subsequent to 1827, a refusal to plead was
treated as equivalent to a plea of not guilty. Id. at 581 n.43.
11. REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 8, at 3.
12. Id. (the period between the return of Charles 1U (1660) and the Revolution of
1688). For a detailed history of the evolution of the right against self-incrimination in
England and the United States, see E.M. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1, 1-23 (1949).
13. T.B. SMrrH, STUDIES CRrIcAL AND COMPARATiVE 280 (1962). This
"dangerous privilege" of giving sworn evidence in one's own behalf was established by
statute in 1898. Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, Stat. 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, noted in
BAKER, supra note 10, at 583.
14. BARTON L. INGRAHAM, THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: LAWS AND
19931
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Although both systems persist in considering confessions as the first
and best form of evidence in a criminal proceeding, they differ greatly on
the treatment of such. Lord Chief Justice Mansfield offered a warning to
common law judges concerning confessions: "Magistrates cannot be too
cautious in receiving confessions, as they very rarely flow from a
conscientious desire to offer reparation."" Additionally, a contemporary
of Mansfield, Sir Michael Foster, noted that "this kind of evidence, I have
found... to be the most suspicious of all testimony."I 6 Yet, the common
law insists that an accused, if he wishes to testify at all, must do so under
oath, thereby exposing himself to perjury on the one hand, guilt on the
other, should he be in any way less than truthful. The civil law, however,
recognizes that an accused person will generally make self-serving, often
untruthful statements in a natural attempt to save himself. Thus, civilian
jurists view the common law rule requiring that an accused testify under
oath, or not at all, as somewhat barbaric. As Professor Dama~ka points
out, "Itihe requirement of oath is said to be an unfair pressure on the
guilty defendant either to convict himself out of his own mouth by telling
the truth, or else to suffer punishment for perjury by lying .... Placing
him in this predicament is even termed inhumane." 7 Nevertheless, civil
law jurisdictions see the accused as the first and foremost evidentiary
source, to be examined before any other form of evidence at the trial."'
In modern times, the common law's adversarial love-hate relationship
with testimony from the accused has grown, in the eyes of many, ever
more anachronistic. The common law's love of confessions, evidenced by
the existence of the plea bargain and the guilty plea in modern adversarial
systems, and the seemingly contradictory presumption against testimony
by the defendant, appears inconsistent to many law enforcement
professionals. Sir Robert Mark, a Commissioner of Scotland Yard, speaks
for many:
Most of these [adversarial] rules are very old. They date from
a time when . . . an accused person was not allowed to give
PRACTICE OF FRANCE, THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, AND THE UNITED STATES 78 (1987).
15. HENRY H. Joy, ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS AND CHALLENGE OF
JURORS 100 (1842).
16. Id.
17. Damaika, supra note 7, at 516.
18. Id. at 529.
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evidence in his own defence, when most accused were ignorant
and illiterate. There was no legal aid and, perhaps most
important, if someone was convicted he would likely be hanged
or transported. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that
the judges who made the rules were concerned to give the
accused every possible protection.19
Although defendants are now deemed competent to testify as witnesses
on their own behalf and penalties are more graduated, the procedural
skeleton remains virtually intact. The "gulf between Is and Ought"2"
apparently grows ever larger and "we learn that coercion is often used to
extract confessions from suspected criminals; we are then told that
convictions based on coerced confessions may not be permitted to stand."21
Yet the Anglo-American common law resists attempts to significantly
change this ossified status quo, based largely upon the perceived necessity
of this tension to the functioning of the adversarial system.22 The need for
a system which excludes of coerced incriminating statements has been
blindly asserted to the point of tautology. Judge Marvin Frankel has
framed the issue more broadly: "We should begin, as a concerted
professional task, to question the premise that adversariness is ultimately
and invariably good."'
Proposals for reform in the American procedure addressing self-
incrimination are often summarily dismissed for resembling European
inquisitorial method; such an analogy conjures up "visions of torture,
19. ROBERT MARK, DIMBLEBY LECTURE FOR 1973 (pamphlet version published by
the British Broadcasting Corporation), reprinted in JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 148-49 (1977).
20. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv 1,
3 (1964).
21. Id.
22. Indeed, the privilege against self-incrimination is, in conjunction with the right
to cross-examination, a defining characteristic of the Anglo-American adversarial system.
23. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Urpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1031, 1052-53 (1975). Judge Frankel suggests that the American legal community
should embrace the Continental preference for "an open and orderly procedure of having
a judicial officer question suspects" rather than the apparent emphasis for station house
confessions with all their attendant room for abuse. Id. at 1053. Although interesting
from a critical standpoint, administrative fact-finding of this type is not realistic within the
constraints of the Constitution.
19931
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secrecy, and dictatorial government " ' and other machinations anathema
to liberal democracy. Yet such assertions rest on a smug, if not arrogant,
confidence that the adversarial system is somehow innately superior to
other forms of criminal justice, and a parallel ignorance of the fact that the
purely inquisitorial system is extinct on this planet.' Oddly enough,
civilian jurists generally view the adversarial "party contest" as a clash of
technicalities showing scant concern for the professed primary goal of
criminal courts: to search for the truth."
C. United States
The Puritans in the early 17th century brought the early form of the
privilege against self-incrimination to the American colonies. By the
1780's nine states adopted the privilege as an integral part of their
respective bills of rights,modeled after Virginia's Declaration of Rights."
The first Congress, on a motion made by James Madison, incorporated the
privilege in the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of Rights. 8 The federal
version differed from those adopted by most states, because it applied only
to criminal prosecutions." It is not entirely clear from the legislative
history of the Fifth Amendment whether the framers intended it to be
identical to the common law privilege as it existed at the time.3"
Regardless of its rather enigmatic beginnings, the American privilege
against self-incrimination was swiftly inculcated within the American
political culture as an undisputed right of the free-born American. In
1821, Chief Justice Marshall asserted that the rights endowed by the Fifth
Amendment were intended "for ages to come . . . designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it."31 The reach
of the Fifth Amendment was not meaningfully tested, however, until the
Supreme Court interpreted it liberally in 1886.32 Six years later, this
24. Id. at 1053.
25. Id.
26. Damafka, supra note 7, at 581-82.
27. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
COMMENTARIES 406 (3d ed. 1988).
28. Id.
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
30. SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 407.
31. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821).
32. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (applying the Fifth Amendment to
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expansive interpretation was extended to all criminal proceedings." By
1936,11 the Supreme Court incorporated, through the due process clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the common law exclusion of
involuntary confessions based on their inherent unreliability. 5 Thus began
the era of fact-specific review for voluntariness, based on the totality of
the circumstances.
1. The Due Process Approach
The Supreme Court considered many factors in assessing the
voluntariness of incriminating statements or confessions, including: age
and education,36 deprivation of food" and sleep,3" and infliction of
psychological coercion. 9 Over the period of more than twenty-five years
through thirty-odd cases, the Supreme Court engendered "an elaborate,
sophisticated, and sensitive approach to admissibility"40 that gave some
recognition to "society's interest in suspect questioning as an instrument
of law enforcement."" As the Supreme Court extended the rights of the
accused, the power of federal law enforcement officers to hold suspects
incommunicado for extended periods was concurrently curtailed;42 such
practices were seen as an open invitation to abuse of the Fifth
the compelled production of business records).
33. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (applying the Fifth Amendment
to grand jury proceedings).
34. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
35. SALTZBURG, supra note 27, at 448-49.
36. Compare Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), holding that the defendant,
who had only a fifth-grade education, did not knowingly waive his Fifth Amendment
rights, with Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), holding that the defendant, who
had attended law school for one year, was able to knowingly waive his Fifth Amendment
rights.
37. Payne, 356 U.S. at 560.
38. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (confession found to have been
obtained through coercion, and therefore, inadmissible where law officers forced defendant
to stay awake for 36 hours).
39. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (court found confession forced,
and therefore, inadmissible where defendant was kept in solitary confinement with no
sleep).
40. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 508 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 509.
42. Id. at 463.
19931
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Amendment.43 This codification of the so-called McNabb-Mallory Rule in
rule 5 of the Federal Code of Criminal Procedure was extended to the
states in 1964."
The Supreme Court's incremental refinement of the due process-based
voluntariness standard proceeded apace until a 1964 Warren Court
decision shed doubt on the standard's future efficacy. In Escobedo v.
Illinois, the Court found the conviction of an accused, who was clearly
coerced into making incriminating statements under the voluntariness
standard, violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.45 The
ensuing confusion for law enforcement officials was short-lived. The
decision in Escobedo paved the way for one of the most noteworthy and
notorious Supreme Court decisions of the century.
2. The Miranda Approach
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Warren Court attempted, in one fell
swoop, to draw a glaringly bright line for both law enforcement and the
courts. In its simplest form, the Miranda majority opinion adopted a per
se exclusionary rule for all statements made by a suspect during a
"custodial confession" absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights." The Court defined a custodial
interrogation as any form of questioning initiated by police after a person
is either in custody or "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. " 47
On a more fundamental level, the Miranda majority adopted the
philosophical position that a person has a "right to a private enclave where
he may lead a private life. That right is the hallmark of our
democracy." 48 The Supreme Court aimed at "placing [the] suspect on
equal footing with the police and placing the inexperienced on a par with
the experienced" through the application of two basic principles.49 First,
43. Id.
44. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
45. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
46. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
47. Id. at 445.
48. Id. at 460 (quoting United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (Frank,
J., dissenting)).
49. Special Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE
L.J. 1519, 1614-15 (1967) [hereinafter New Haven Project).
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the Fifth Amendment forbids all forms of pressure or coercion aimed at
inducing an accused to incriminate himself, and second, the indispensable
prerequisite to an intelligent waiver is precise knowledge of ones' Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights.5 0 The majority broke new ground in the
application of these principles. Three of the four cases argued
concurrently with Miranda involved written confessions signed by the
accused. 5 Chief Justice Warren went as far as to state, "in these cases,
we might not find the defendants' statements to have been involuntary in
traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards to protect precious
Fifth Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened in the slightest. "2
The Miranda court grounded its sweeping per se exclusionary rule on
an inherent distrust of the police interrogation room." This is evident in
the Court's adherence to the importance of an accused's access to counsel:
"The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very
quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by
interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the
interrogation is indispensable. "s The Court did not go so far as to
encompass the mandatory presence of counsel within the sweep of its new
exclusionary rule. However, if an "interrogation continues without the
presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on
the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right.
• . to counsel."" The Miranda court, while stating quite unequivocally
that all questioning must cease immediately when a suspect expresses a
desire to remain silent or requests the assistance of counsel, did not
exclude "volunteered statements" made to law enforcement authorities
without any sort of prompting."'
50. Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh-A
Statistical Study, 29 U. PrrT. L. REv. 1, 3 (1967).
51. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
52. Id. at 457.
53. Id. at 469.
54. Id. (emphasis added). In an interesting if not altogether befuddling bit of legal
legerdemain, the Chief Justice adds, in the next paragraph, that the presence of counsel
would also aid police in validating the "trustworthiness" of statements should his client
choose to confess. Id. at 470.
55. Id. at 475 (quoting Escobedo v. illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n. 14 (1964)).
56. Id. at 478.
1993]
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Facially, Miranda purported to draw bright lines between the police
and the suspect in custody, but a light scratch of the surface revealed some
glaring problems and inconsistencies with this per se approach. The
Miranda dissent argued that the majority's strict exclusionary rule was
both under and overinclusive. Justice White pointed out that if the
majority's goal was to eliminate the inherent coerciveness of custodial
interrogation, then the exclusionary rule should be applied to all statements
made by the accused, while in custody, regardless of knowing waiver.57
Justice Harlan, also writing in dissent, posited the underinclusiveness of
the majority's tack: the new per se rule does not stop coercion or even
brutality because unscrupulous police officers will simply dissemble
concerning knowing waiver, as they would have done previously
concerning the circumstances of voluntariness. 5 "The aim in short is
toward 'voluntariness' in a utopian sense, or to view it from a different
angle, voluntariness with a vengeance." 9
At least three other related problems arise from the majority's per se
rule. First, the majority placed great emphasis on their desire to end
"police manual" interrogation procedures, but the per se exclusionary rule
was not "sensibly tailored" to that end. What emerged is a situation
where an assertion of rights leads to immediate cut-off of all questioning,
including even brief or reasonable questioning. Conversely, coercive
questioning may continue indefinitely after a waiver of rights.' Second,
if custodial statements are innately coerced, an accompanying warning will
not preclude a finding of coercion, nor does the omission of warnings
necessarily constitute any additional coercion.6' Finally, the presumption
that custody equals coercion may not be universally valid.62
III. THE PLACE OF SELF-INCRIMINATION IN AMERICAN LAW
The question then remains-what protections do Americans (or
perhaps more appropriately, the American legal profession) really desire
57. Id. at 533 (White, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. Id.
60. See generally REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 8.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 50 (referring to the questioning by local police of Senator Edward Kennedy
after the Chappaquidick incident; the report points out that Senator Kennedy himself was
a lawyer and was accompanied by a former assistant attorney general-hardly the
circumstances making for an innately coercive environment).
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against self-incrimination and, in particular, coerced confessions?
Professor Herbert L. Packer, in a seminal law review article first
published in 1964, proposed that what Americans really desire in their
system of criminal procedure is, borrowing from our economic brethren,
a kind of production possibilities frontier, a "guns-or-butter" model
susceptible to manipulation by the political branches. Packer labels his
two possibilities Due Process and Crime Control.'
Packer views the machinations of the American criminal procedure
system as oscillating between two "models." Indeed, a gain in Due
Process for the criminal is seen as a diminution in Crime Control for
society as a whole. Packer analogizes these models quite effectively: the
Crime Control model is seen as an efficient assembly line with various
specialty stations performing specific functions along the way, whereas the
Due Process model is an obstacle course, designed to place barriers in the
path of the government in carrying the accused along in the judicial
process.6
The Miranda decision was and is viewed as a rather large swing of
the procedural pendulum in the direction of Due Process. According to
Packer's analysis, the majority's per se exclusion rule is inimical to the
Crime Control model.' Since the exclusionary rule would ultimately
encourage litigation concerning asserted violations, the Miranda rule
stands in the way of an efficient Crime Control process "[o]ne that throws
off at an early stage those cases in which it appears unlikely that the
person apprehended is an offender and then secures, as expeditiously as
possible, the conviction of the rest with a minimum of occasions for
challenge, let alone postaudit."6 Ultimately, reduced to its barest bones,
the Crime Control model would involve just two steps: administrative fact-
finding, at which point the innocent would be ejected from the system,
followed by a guilty plea, eliminating or minimizing the need for judicial
fact-finding.67
Packer's view is generally, although not universally, accepted as a
useful and insightful paradigm for procedural analysis.68
63. Packer, supra note 20, at 1-18.
64. Id. at 11-13.
65. Id. at 17-18.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Id. at 13.
68. See, e.g., John Griffiths, Ideology and Criminal Procedure, 79 YALE L.J. 359
1993]
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IV. SELF-INCRIMINATION IN OTHER COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS
A. England
In England, the criminal courts apply, as their American cousins did
prior to Miranda, a "voluntariness" standard to custodial confessions and
other self-incriminating statements by an accused.69 In the interest of
providing a degree of predictability, the English judiciary and Home
Office developed a set of guidelines for exclusion known as the Judges'
Rules.7° These Rules can be adequately canvassed in five steps. First,
citizens have a duty to cooperate with the police.7" Second, police are not
permitted to take an individual into custody, without a formal arrest.'
Third, when arrested, a suspect has only a limited right to counsel. 3
Fourth, as soon as there is sufficient evidence to charge a suspect, the
police should do so immediately. 74 Finally, all confessions must be
voluntary in light of all the circumstances."
After passage of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act in 1984, the
Judges' Rules have been largely codified and partially superseded. Police
are now permitted to detain a suspect for twenty-four hours without
formally charging him,76 with a possible extension to thirty-six hours if a
(1970). Griffiths proposes that Packer's models are simply two manifestations of the same
ideological view of the adversarial system of criminal justice. Instead, Griffiths
consolidates the Crime Control and Due Process models within a single "Battle" model,
contrasting this with his alternative "Family" model. This Family model would be based
upon a highly-individualized approach to criminal punishment, based equally on the needs
of the convicted criminal and society at large. Id. Although interesting as a think piece,
Griffiths' Family model bears, twenty years later, no resemblance to any extant system
of criminal justice anywhere in the United States, although it may be a fair representation
in part of some foreign criminal justice systems.
69. Glanville L. Williams, England, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
185-86 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962).
70. Judith Kaci, Confessions: A Conparison of Exclusion Under Miranda in the




74. Id. at 90.
75. Id. at 91.




senior police official thinks it necessary to preserve evidence or to conduct
investigation expeditiously.7 Any further detention must be justified on
reasonable cause to a magistrate,78 who can then extend detention to a total
of ninety-six hours.79 In addition, suspect may be held incommunicado for
up to thirty-six hours8° if he is detained for a serious offense.8" Although
a suspect enjoys an absolute right to counsel, access to a solicitor can be
delayed for up to thirty-six hours.8 2 While a suspect is in custody, police
may take fingerprints and other "intimate samples," 3 but these must be
destroyed if a suspect is subsequently cleared." The Police and Criminal
Evidence Act does not specifically require that the suspect be informed of
certain rights or privileges.
English judges liberally exclude statements upon any showing of
inducement by the authorities; however, a subjective causal connection
between the inducement and the subsequent incriminating statements must
be demonstrated. 5 Judges are particularly inclined to exclude self-
incriminating statements elicited in violation of the Judges' Rules when
accompanied by a statutory or common law breach.8 6 Yet even in these
circumstances, exclusion is within the discretion of the judge, and any
incriminating statement may be admitted if the judge is satisfied as to its
overall voluntariness.
87
Absent from the Judges' Rules is a requirement that the accused be
notified of his right to counsel. It is possible that the right to counsel is
specifically excluded based upon a kind of "efficiency" view of the
criminal process, but even this justification is apparently lost after
probable cause attaches and the decision is made to charge, thereby
theoretically precluding any further questioning by the police. 8
77. Id. § 42(1).
78. Id. § 43(1).
79. Id. § 44(3)(b).
80. Id. § 56(3).
81. Id. § 56(2)(a).
82. Id. § 58(5).
83. Id. §§ 61-63.
84. Id. § 64(1).
85. Kaci, supra note 70, at 91, 92.
86. FRED KAuFMAN, THE ADMISSmIirrY OF CONFESSIONS 137 (1979).
87. Id.
88. Kaci, supra note 70, at 104-06.
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The English seem particularly concerned about the formalization of
custodial confessions. A confession or other self-incriminating statement
must be reduced to writing, signed by the accused, and accompanied by
a signed certification of voluntariness.89 Additionally, the police are not
permitted to prompt statements nor use a question-and-answer format."°
Although the procedures appear cumbersome, the police are well rewarded
for this additional effort; such confessions enjoy almost per se
admissibility.9"
B. Canada
The Canadian right to silence was based upon the English right. In
Canada, as in England, the privilege against self-incrimination is based on
the absence of any right by the police to coerce statements from an
accused rather than any absolute protection against self-incrimination.'
The Canadian courts adopted the English Judges' Rules in 1918," 3
modifying them somewhat, but still generally toeing the English line.'
The cautions which must be given, however, differ rather substantially.
An individual taken into custody must be immediately notified of the
charges against him and informed that he has an absolute right to retain
counsel. 9 The accused must be brought before a magistrate within
twenty-four hours of his initial detention for formal arraignment" and a
judicial advisory of his rights. The police, however, are not required to
advise a suspect or an accused of his right to silence, the implications of
self-incriminating statements, the availability of appointed counsel, or his
89. Id. at 102.
90. Id.
91. Id. For an extreme example of how even this formalized system for assuring the
voluntariness of custodial confessions may go awry, see Quentin Cowdy, Appeal Court
Frees Man Who 'Confessed' to Disbanded Squad, THE TIMES (London), Feb. 24, 1990,
at 3 (detailing one of several written confessions fabricated by the now-defunct West
Midlands Serious Crimes Squad).
92. RICHARD V. ERICSON & PATRICIA M. BARANEK, THE ORDERING OF JUSTICE:
A STUDY OF ACCUSED PERSONS AS DEPENDENTS IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 49 (1982).
93. R. v. Voisin, (1918), 13 Cr. App. R. 89 (C.C.A.), cited in KAUFMAN, supra
note 86, at 149.
94. KAUFMAN, supra note 86, at 149.




privilege to refuse questioning.97 Confessions and other self-incriminating
statements are admitted on a voluntariness standard, with the Canadian
courts applying a less restrictive standard for admissibility than the
English.98
Some Canadian commentators have observed that the entire criminal
process, from intake to verdict, tends to favor coercive tactics by the
police and prosecutors. 99 Whereas an accused in custody who is told to
make an incriminating statement many times will, the "complex and
procedure-ridden process of the criminal courts" de facto preclude the
accused from offering an explanation or questioning any step of the
process. °° The system of plea bargaining is, even more so than in the
United States, a coercive instrument in the hands of the police. One study
revealed that, in cases involving plea bargains, seventy-nine percent
involved direct police participation, with the police officer as the only
public official involved in fifty-two percent."'
With the declaration of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms"° in 1982, the privilege against self-incrimination and to access
to counsel may rise to the level of constitutionally-entrenched rights. As
of May 1991, however, Canadian courts have declined granting an
absolute right to counsel' °3 or against self-incrimination."
C. Scotland
As a hybrid system of uncodified civil law with a 300-year-old
common law overlay,105 Scotland represents a suitable model for the
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. ERICSON & BARANEK, supra note 92, at 193-202.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 59.
102. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1 (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), which was adopted incident to the Canada Act (1982), which officially
returned sovereignty to the Canadian Parliament from Westminster.
103. See, e.g., Howard v. Presiding Officer of the Inmate Disciplinary Court, 57
F.C. 280 (1987) (holding that there is no right to counsel at parole hearings); Regina v.
Rowbotham, 63 O.A.C.3d 113 (1980) (Ont.) (holding that there is no "constitutionalized
right" to funded counsel for the indigent).
104. See Regina v. Woolley 63 O.A.C.3d 333 (1988) (Ont.) (holding that courts may
exclude evidence obtained from a violation by police of the right to silence if admitting
such evidence would "bring the administration of justice into disrepute").
105. Act of Union, 1707, 5&6 Anne c.8. (Eng.). The Act of Union unified the
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interaction of the two predominant legal systems. Like all common and
civil law jurisdictions, Scottish criminal law recognizes that an accused
should not be compelled to convict himself from his own mouth. This
assumption underlies the rather strict exclusionary rule for unfairly coerced
confessions in Scotland. °0
The Scots' view of confessions or other incriminating statements given
at the station house is quite disapproving:
In the eyes of every ordinary citizen, the venue is a sinister one.
When he stands alone in such a place confronted by several
police officers.., the dice are loaded against him, especially as
he knows that there is no one to corroborate him as to what
exactly occurred during interrogation, how it was conducted, and
how long it lasted. 1 07
The Scots take a rather pragmatic view of law enforcement,
recognizing that the people have some interest in expeditious police
investigation. As in England, no privilege against self-incrimination
attaches when an individual is merely questioned by police. 0 8 Upon
parliaments of Scotland and England, the crowns having been joined with the accession
of James VI (of Scotland) and James I (of England) upon the death of Elizabeth I in 1603.
The Act made the Courts of Session, hearing civil matters, subject to the ultimate
appellate authority of the House of Lords, but through a quirky piece of draftsmanship,
intentional or otherwise, the Act only subjects the Scottish criminal courts to the authority
of those parts of Parliament sitting at Westminster. Id. Since the Lords were not sitting
at Westminster in 1707, criminal appeals in Scotland are heard only by a special panel of
the High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh. This fact has, in many respects, allowed the
Scottish criminal law, more so than most other areas of Scottish law, to retain a large
portion of its original Dutch-Roman flavor. See generally SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 3-21 (1938).
106. Paul Hardin, Other Answers: Search and Seizure, Coerced Confessions, and
Criminal Trial in Scotland, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 165, 177 (1964). For a good example
of the strictness of this exclusionary rule, at least prior to 1980, see Manuel v. H.M.
Advocate, [1958] J.C. 41 (Scot.) (involving the written confession of convicted mass
murderer, Peter Manuel).
107. Chalmers v. H.M. Advocate, [1954] J.C. 66 (Scot. H.C.J.). It is not clear why
the Scottish legal system takes a markedly more distrustful view of police activity than do
the English or the continental systems. The Scots' distrust may have to do with the
country's rather unpleasant experiences at the hands of the English following the
suppression of Prince Charlie's Rebellion and the subsequent Highland Clearances, seen
even today by many Scots as institutionally sanctioned ethnocide.
108. Hardin, supra note 106, at 172-74. There have been in the past some problems
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arrest, Scottish courts are quite strict: after a suspect is "arrested,
cautioned, and charged,""° police may undertake no further interrogations
and any custodial confessions will be subject to a rigorous "voluntariness"
review."' Generally, courts prefer that if an accused wishes to make a
voluntary statement or confession, the statements should be made only
after specific consultation with a solicitor, given to a senior police official
not directly involved in the case, reduced to a writing that includes
cautions, and signed by the accused.' In 1980, the near per se bar on
police custodial questioning was relaxed somewhat with the adoption of the
Criminal Justice Act.1 12 The Act sought to strike a more realistic balance
between the rights of the individual and the interests of society in the
detection of crime. Police were authorized to detain an individual in
custody for questioning, but this authority was limited to detention for no
more than six hours.' During that time, the police could fingerprint,
search, and interrogate a suspect. However, the police were required to
advise a suspect of the absolute right to remain silent, the right to a
solicitor at government expense, and the right to request that one other
person, other than a solicitor, be informed of his whereabouts. 4
Additionally, the Act featured a revival of a limited form of judicial
examination. Although similar to an initial appearance or arraignment in
the United States, the new judicial examination would allow the
prosecutor 15 to "put to an accused questions designed to elicit any
explanation he may have to offer."" 6 This revived form of judicial
examination was justified by the government as offering the accused an
with police "inviting" people to accompany them to the police station for questioning,
making this seemingly innocent mere questioning appear a bit more earnest.
109. A.V. SHEEHAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN SCOTLAND AND FRANCE 133 (1975).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 133. For these reasons, custodial confessions play a pivotal part in very
few Scottish criminal prosecutions.
112. Act of Adjournal (Procedures under Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980,
No. 1), reprinted in GERALD H. GORDON, THE CRWWAL JUSTICE (SCOTLAND) ACT 1980
145 (1981).
113. REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 8, at 89.
114. Id. at 90.
115. The prosecutor is officially known as the procurator fiscal in Scotland.
116. 982 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 821 (1980) (statement of George Younger,
Secretary of State for Scotland).
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early opportunity to lay the foundation for challenging a confession or
presenting an alibi. The Crown, in turn, could comment at trial upon an
accused's refusal to answer questions at the judicial examination."1 7
Although the ability of the Crown to comment on an accused's silence
at trial was seen by some as a retrograde step in protecting the rights of
the accused, it should be noted that judges were already permitted to make
comment to the jury concerning silence by the accused.118  Some
commentators see this counterbalanced by other, peculiarly pro-accused,
elements in Scottish criminal procedure. 9
Two other unique, at least in a common law sense, features of
Scottish criminal procedure deserve comment. As in most civil law
jurisdictions, if police are led to physical evidence by coerced statements
from the accused, the evidence itself is admissible. 20 The prosecution
must, however, find some way of linking the evidence to the accused other
than by the coerced statements. 2 Second, the Scots have adopted, since
the institution of criminal legal aid in 1964, a "Duty Solicitor Scheme.""
Each local Committee of the Bar drafts an annual Duty Plan, insuring that
one or more local solicitors is readily available at all times to advise any
detainees in police custody."z
117. Id. at 853, 854. The Labour MPs, who represented a vast majority of Scottish
constituencies, saw this resuscitated judicial examination as a serious threat to the right
of an accused to remain silent, since his silence at the judicial examination could be
commented upon by the Crown at trial, and therefore represented a de facto form of self-
incrimination. Id. at 923.
One practitioner's handbook advises solicitors to question their clients about any
extrajudicial statements, stating "[i]f there is anything untoward... the solicitor should
advise the accused to mention this at a judicial examination." ALASTAIR STEWART, THE
SCOTTISH CRMINIAL COURTS IN ACTION 99-100 (1990).
118. Scott v. H.M. Advocate, [1946] J.C. 3 (Scot. H.C.J).
119. Hardin, supra note 106, at 182-84 (referring, for example, to the requirement
that two witnesses speak to the accused's guilt, including two-witness corroboration of any
inculpatory physical evidence).
120. Perhaps physical evidence is deemed different because "however obtained, it
cannot lie." K.D. EWING & W. FINNIE, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN SCOTLAND: CASES AND
MATERIALS 102 (1982).
121. Chalmers v. H.M. Advocate, [19541 J.C. 66 (Scot. H.C.J.).





D. Other Common Law Influenced Jurisdictions
Some other jurisdictions have much of their antecedents in the
common law. India, for instance, excludes all custodial statements made
by an accused, requiring that confessions be made before a judicial forum.
Evidence derived from a coerced statement, along with the relevant part
of the statement itself, is admissible. At trial, a judge is required to
question the accused, albeit unsworn, after conclusion of the prosecution's
evidence, and unfavorable inferences can be drawn from an accused's
subsequent silence. 24
Israel, although providing no statutory or constitutional guarantee,
traces its privilege against self-incrimination through the Judaic Law to the
fourth century B.C." Israeli law does not allow a suspect to be held
more than forty-eight hours without being charged, with the Israeli courts
applying the Judges' Rules for required cautions and prohibited
interrogations. Confessions and incriminating statements are admitted on
a basically English voluntariness standard.
126
V. SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS
A. France
Under the French Code de Procedure Penale, article 114 grants all
accused persons the right of silence, but only explicitly before the juge
d'instruction. "7 Traditionally, this right has been extended to include all
judicial proceedings.12 However, this right does not extend to police
interrogations. 129 Additionally, article 114 requires that an accused be
informed of his right to remain silent at his first appearance before the
124. REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 8, at 88-89.
125. Haim H. Cohn, Israel, in POLICE POWER AND INDWIDUAL FREEDOM 265-268
(Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962).
126. Id. at 201-04. One should not be too hasty, however, in accepting as given
these procedural safeguards. The ongoing problems in the West Bank, most notably the
innfada, have cast doubts on the equal applicability of Israeli procedural safeguards.
127. Pieck, supra note 2, at 585. Thejuge d'instruction is the investigating judicial
officer who prepares the dossier (case file), which is heavily relied upon by the trial court.
Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 586.
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juge d'instruction. However, before the accused's first appearance he may
be interrogated by both the police and the procureur without cautions or
counsel. 13
What emerges from the application of article 114 is that, much like
the English system, the level of protection an accused receives depends on
his status. In the French criminal justice system, a person is not an
accused, and therefore is not given the protections of article 114, until
officially arraigned before ajuge d'instruction."' By law, however, the
police and prosecutor may hold a suspect3 2 and interrogate him for up to
forty-eight hours (the garde d vue) without charging before a juge
d'instruction."3 Any statements made during this time are entered in the
dossier and admitted at trial. 134 Once a suspect is charged, however, the
juge d'instruction must advise the accused of his right to know the charges
against him, to remain silent, and to secure free counsel prior to any
judicial examination.13'
When examined before the juge d'instruction, that an accused's right
to silence may be inviolate in theory, but the practical ramifications of
refusal to answer questions can be significant. Although pre-trial detention
is generally frowned upon in most civil law jurisdictions,' 36 refusal to
cooperate in the fact-finding process may lead to detention.137 The
accused's demeanor and attitude at the judicial examination will be
commented upon in the dossier by the juge d'instruction, obliging the
130. Id. at 596. The procureur is the public prosecutor in France.
131. Id. at 592.
132. INGRAHAm, supra note 14, at 62. The French Code of Criminal Procedure
does, however, require that detailed notes be kept for the dossier. These notes must
include the dates and times of any interrogations, rest periods, and release of the accused.
C. PR. PaN. arts. 64, 65. The accused must be shown these notes and he must sign them.
Id. See also Richard Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice as a Guide to Law Reform.
How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL.
L. REv. 539, 581-82 (1990).
133. INGRAHAM, supra note 14, at 62.
134. Id. at 48. Thejuge d'instruction may, of course, disregard a coerced statement
if, in his opinion, the coercion has rendered the statements so unreliable as to be
irrelevant.
135. Id. at 74.
136. RUDOLF SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXT, &
MATERIALS 480-81 (1988).
137. Pieck, supra note 2, at 598.
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accused to offer some explanation. 3 ' French law does not allow the trial
court to draw an inference of guilt from the accused's silence, yet his
reticence will generally reinforce the state's case and may be commented
upon unfavorably by the judge and prosecutor. 39 Finally, the accused is
never put on oath at any stage of the judicial process. Therefore, the
threat of perjury does not reinforce any desire to remain silent." °
When the accused is finally brought to trial, he is not systematically
excluded from participation as in the adversarial process. In France, trials
generally commence with an examination of the accused by the presiding
judge. This examination includes the accused's name and personal
history, summation of prior offenses, details of the charges and accused's
reactions to them, the accused's rebuttals to the statements of witnesses,
and a kind of cross-examination by the judge, prosecutor, and the
accused's counsel. 1 ' Even if the accused decides to make a judicial
confession at trial, this does not, as in the common law, signal
acquiescence to immediate judgment. Rather, such a confession is treated
as an important piece of evidence, evaluated by the court with all the other
relevant evidence. 142
The French take a markedly different view of remedies for a violation
of an accused's rights. Since there is no real exclusionary rule, remedial
measures take the form of administrative actions. The most salient of
these is the remedy for detention without charge for a period longer than
forty-eight hours. The responsible police officer is disciplined by his
superiors within the police bureaucracy. Additionally, the officer may be




140. INGRAHAM, supra note 14, at 79. The French extend the privilege of testifying
unsworn not only to the defendant, but also to his spouse, parents, collaborators,
accomplices, and all relatives to the fourth degree. WILLIAMS, supra note 69, at 259.
Relatives in the fourth degree include grandnephews and nieces, great aunts and uncles,
and first cousins. JOHN RITCHIE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS'
ESTATES AND TRUSTS 91 (7th ed. 1988).
141. SHEEHAN, supra note 109, at 72-73. Article 238 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure requires only that the presiding judge "shall interrogate the accused and receive
his statement." C. PR. PtN. art. 238 (Kock trans., 2d ed. 1988 as The French Code of
Criminal Procedure).
142. INGRAHAM, supra note 14, at 50.
143. SHEEHAN, supra note 109, at 38.
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B. Germany
Under section 136(1) of the Strafprozeflordnung, "the German police,
prosecutors, and courts are required to respect an individual's right against
self-incrimination. 45 Applied more expansively than the French privilege,
this right extends to those suspected of committing a crime, those against
whom criminal proceedings have been initiated, and those formerly
charged and bound over for trial. 1
46
German police are permitted to hold a suspect in custody until the day
following the arrest, but are supposed to advise the suspect of the
presumed charges, the right to silence, and his right to counsel. 147 The
suspect may consult with counsel, but counsel may not be present during
interrogation. 4 ' Although required by statute, the omission of cautions
does not result in the exclusion of confessions or self-incriminating
statements.149 Additionally, physical evidence gained from an improperly
procured statement is admissible in court.'50
At trial, the contribution expected of the accused is similar to that in
France. The trial generally opens with examination of the accused
concerning personal details and then, after recautioning as to his right to
silence, questioning concerning the specific offenses at bar.15 The
accused may refuse to answer each specific inquiry, and the court is
prohibited from drawing a legal inference from such a refusal.'
Surprisingly, nearly half of all defendants tender judicial confessions
anyway.153 This apparent penchant to confess may be attributable to
144. StPO § 136(1) (F.R.G.) (Schmidt trans., 1965 as The Gernan Code of Criminal
Procedure). The code specifically prohibits coercion by "ill-treatment, fatigue, physical
interference, dispensing medicines, torture, deception, or hypnosis." Id. at 78. Section
M states that these prohibitions apply "irrespective of the accused person's consent.
Statements which were obtained in violation .. may not be used even if the accused
agrees to said use." Id.
145. Pieck, supra note 2, at 586.
146. Id. at 594-95.
147. REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 8, at 94.
148. Pieck, supra note 2, at 596, 597.
149. REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 8, at 94.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. LAN"BEIN, supra note 19, at 72-73.
153. Id. at 74.
[Vol. 14
SELF-INCRIMINATION
several factors. First, a guilty plea is not dispositive, nor does it relieve
the court of its duty to conduct a trial. The court has an absolute duty to
examine the accused, and this obligation cannot be fulfilled by reviewing
a transcript or written copy of a confession." s' Second, although the court
is prohibited in most cases from drawing a legal inference of guilt from
the accused's silence, the German system of free evaluation of all relevant
evidence tends to put a negative gloss on other evidence when the accused
refuses to answer judicial inquiries. 55 Third, the judge and prosecutor
may make unfavorable comments regarding an accused's silence.156
Finally, an accused's silence may be considered an aggravating factor in
sentencing after a determination of guilt.157
Unlike the French, the Germans have one exclusionary rule. If self-
incriminating statements are coerced by specifically prohibited police
behavior, they are excluded from evidence. This exclusionary rule, unlike
its common law brethren, is based on the perceived irrelevancy of




Under article 29(1) of the Dutch Wetboek van Strafvordering,159 an
accused has no obligation to answer inquiries by the police, prosecutor, or
judge." An "accused" is defined as a person about whom there is "on the
basis of facts and circumstances . . . a reasonable suspicion of guilt of
having committed any punishable act" 6 or against whom a prosecution
has been initiated.' 62
154. Id. at 66-67.
155. Pieck, supra note 2, at 598.
156. Id. at 599.
157. Id.
158. LANGBEIN, supra note 19, at 69. It is not entirely clear why the German courts,
with their preference for free evaluation of all evidence, do not admit purportedly coerced
statements along with evidence of coercion mitigating the credibility of the statements.
The rule is detailed in StPO § 136(a)(3).
159. Sv. art. 29(1) (Neth.) (Code of Criminal Procedure), cited in Pieck, supra note
2, at 585.
160. Pieck, supra note 2, at 586.
161. Sv. art. 27.
162. Pieck, supra note 2, at 586.
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Compared to other civil law jurisdictions, the Dutch system takes a
much less rigorous stance in protecting this codified right of an accused.
The accused is purposefully not cautioned concerning his rights so as not
to discourage his cooperation in the truth-finding process. 16 The accused
also has a right to consult with counsel, but the police and prosecutor may
suspend any such consultation for up to six days.'6
As in France and Germany, an accused faces several influential
factors which may compel him to answer inquiries. First, he may be
subject to pre-trial detention. Second, his silence may be subjected to
unfavorable comment at trial. 65 Third, although his silence cannot be
legally dispositive, it will weigh heavily and can become dispositive when
joined by other minimal evidence. 66  An accused's silence cannot,
however, be considered an aggravating factor at sentencing.
1 67
D. Norway
The Norwegian criminal justice system, although resembling other
major civil law jurisdictions in most respects, has a few interesting
idiosyncrasies. As in Germany, a suspect can be held overnight without
being charged, but the police are not required to caution him concerning
his rights. 168  In practice, Norwegian police may generally caution a
suspect that his silence, not his statements, can be used against him at
trial. 169 Under the Criminal Code, an accused is under no duty to make
a statement, but if he chooses to make one, he must tell the truth, if he
can do so without exposing himself or his family to danger of punishment
163. Id. at 597 (asserting that the theory underlying this deliberate omission of
cautions is that an innocent person will remain silent because he simply does not know the
details of a crime he did not commit, whereas with a guilty person, the very act of
advising will suggest to him that he not cooperate in the ascertainment of his own guilt).
164. Id. at 597.
165. Id. at 600.
166. Id. at 599-600. Police may detain suspects for 48 hours. Prosecutors may then
detain suspects for an additional 48 hours. With a court order, suspects may be detained
for up to 110 days. DAVID DOWNES, CONTRACTS IN TOLERANCE 14 (1988).
167. Pieck, supra note 2, at 600.
168. Anders Bratholm, Norway, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 211,
212 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962).
169. Id. at 211.
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or the loss of the respect of his fellow citizens. 170 There is, however, no
legal penalty for perjury.171
The Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act prohibits police from
extracting incriminating statements by the exertion of undue pressure,'17
but offers no guidelines concerning what methods constitute undue
pressure. 173 Although written confessions are not admitted into evidence,
a police officer may review the confession and testify as to those
statements written in his presence.' 74 The accused has the right to consult
counsel at the earliest stages of the criminal process, but in practice, this
right is seldom respected until after the initial judicial appearance.
75
E. Japan
The Japanese criminal law joined the circle of codified civil law
jurisdictions during the late 19th century after the Meiji Restoration.
176
Initially, the traditional elements of torture and the requirement of a
confession for conviction were retained. 177 Under European influence, the
170. Criminal Code of 1902 §§ 167,333 (1902) (Nor.), cited in Williams, supra note
69, at 211.
171. Bratholm, supra note 168, at 211.
172. Criminal Procedure Act §§ 256-258 (1887) (Nor.).
173. Bratholm, supra note 168, at 211.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 211, 212.
176. Williams, supra note 69, at 269. As a part of the rapid modernization program
undertaken after the collapse of the Tokagawa shogunate, the Japanese adopted new
criminal procedure and penal codes based on the French model. B.J. George, Jr., Rights
of the Criminally Accused, 53 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 71, 73 (1990). For a detailed
history of the Meiji criminal law reforms, see PAUL CH'EN, THE FORMATION OF THE
EARLY MEuI LEGAL ORDER 31-79 (1981). See also GEORGE BECKMAN, THE MAKING
OF THE MEre CONsTrrTuTioN (1957).
177. Haruo Abe, Japan, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 268, 269
(Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962). The Meiji government originally continued the use of
torture, with certain restrictions; for example, no one under fifteen nor over seventy could
be tortured. PAUL HENG-CHAO CHEN, THE FORMATION OF THE EARLY MEuI LEGAL
ORDER 65 (London Oriental Series Vol. 35, 1981). By happenstance, the European jurist
Boissonade de Fontarabie, acting as a government advisor on legal reform, witnessed the
torture of a suspect and immediately pressed the Ministry of Justice to abolish all torture.
Official torture had all but ceased by 1879 and was officially abolished in 1882. Id. at
67.
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Japanese abandoned these practices in 1879 and adopted a system whereby
convictions are based solely upon the evaluation of evidence. 17
Although guaranteed by the post-war Japanese constitution, 79
Japanese have no historical precedents (other than the wholly artificial
imposition of the European concept in 1879) for a privilege against self-
incrimination. Indeed, before the 1879 reforms, self-incrimination was
encouraged in the harshest form: by torture. It is not surprising then that
Japanese law enforcement has traditionally been quite hostile to the
privilege." 0 Although required to advise suspects of their right to silence
prior to interrogation, this is usually no more extensive than a "reluctantly
murmur[ed] . . . prototype phrase: 'You don't have to answer, if you
don't want to.'"'
Japanese police may detain and interrogate a suspect for forty-eight
hours without approval from a prosecutor or review by a magistrate.
18 2
Upon a showing of probable cause to a magistrate, a suspect can be
detained for ten days; those accused of serious crimes may be held for an
additional ten days.1 83 Extended detention is the rule, resulting primarily
from the police and prosecutors' great preference for confessions over any
other form of evidence."' Additionally, detained suspects have no access
to bail, since they have not yet been charged.
18 5
178. Abe, supra note 177, at 269.
179. Article 38 reads: "No person shall be compelled to testify against himself. No
confession shall be admitted in evidence if made under compulsion, torture or threat, or
after prolonged arrest or detention. No person shall be convicted or punished in cases
where the only proof against him is his own confession." KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR'S
JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 308 (1991).
180. Abe, supra note 177, at 270.
181. Id. Although constitutionally mandated, the right to silence is implemented
through the Code of Criminal Procedure, art. 311(1). George, supra note 176, at 103
n.288. Professor Dando points out that the voluntariness of a custodial confession
generally turns on the interpretation of "prolonged detention." SHIGEM1TSU DANDO,
JAPANESE LAW OF CR MHNAL PROCEDURE 197 (B.J. George, Jr. trans., 1965).
182. DANDO, supra note 181, at 205.
183. George, supra note 176, at 88-89.
184. See generally Abe, supra note 177, at 206.
185. Id. Apparently, it is not at all uncommon for people who are either innocent
or not prosecutable to be detained for long periods. In 1958, for example, of 113,065
persons held for 5 to 10 days before being released or formally charged, and 40,203 were
never prosecuted. Id. This represents a "miss" rate of over 35 %. Id.
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During detention, suspects generally have access to counsel, but this
right is subject to the "designation authority" of prosecutors and police.
1 6
This authority, amounting to time and place restrictions for suspect-
counsel consultation, is systematically used to severely limit a suspect's
access to his counsel to two or three 15-minute interviews during a ten-day
detention. 187
In theory, any statements made after the expiration of the permissible
detention period are barred from admission at trial.' In practice,
prosecutors have seldom, if ever, attempted to admit such statements, so
the question is essentially moot. 8 9 Even total denial of access to counsel
extended beyond the prescribed period does not necessarily lead to
exclusion, since confessions made after complete denial of counsel have
been admitted. 9 '
F. Other Civil Law Jurisdictions
Although sometimes viewed as a distinct form, socialist jurisdictions
are generally codified civil law jurisdictions with peculiarly socialist
substantive law. Many of these jurisdictions recognize an accused's right
to silence. In Russia, as in Germany, "[an acknowledgement of guilt by
the accused may become the basis for an accusation only if
acknowledgement is confirmed by the totality of the evidence in the
case." 
191
186. Id. at 208. "The legal dichotomy between suspects and accused persons...
is critical: the constitutional right to counsel in Japan governs only after the institution of
public prosecution. Before that time, the claim to counsel is purely statutory under the
Code of Criminal Procedure." George, supra note 176, at 96-97.
187. Abe, supra note 177, at 208-09. Since a suspect may be held for his entire
detention (up to 20 days or more) in a police detention cell, many allegations of abuse of
detainees' rights have arisen as a result. George, supra note 176, at 89-90 n. 150.
188. Abe, supra note 177, at 210. If a confession is made after an unduly long
detention, it may still be admitted since a long enough lapse between the detention and the
confession can eliminate the "significant effects" of the detention. DANDO, supra note
181, at 196.
189. Abe, supra note 177, at 210.
190. D.NDO, supra note 181, at 196. Professor Dando states, regarding exclusion,
"We probably should not make use of the Anglo-American evidence law doctrines on the
point in their present form." DANDO, supra note 181, at 197.
191. UPK RSFSR art. 77, cited in INGRAH4AM, supra note 14, at 80 (limited to the
Russian Republic, but representative of similar provisions in the codes of criminal
procedure in other former-Soviet republics). An admittedly biased contrary view of the
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In the People's Republic of China, the accused enjoys no explicit right
to silence; the Criminal Procedure Law states that "[t]he defendant shall
answer the questions put by the investigation personnel according to the
facts."I' Somewhat paradoxically, the police are specifically prohibited
from using coercive methods: "It]he gathering of evidence by threat,
enticement, deceit, or other unlawful methods are strictly prohibited."193
VI. SELF-INCRIM[NATION IN RELIGIOUS AND TRADITIONAL
JURISDICTIONS
A. Islamic Law
The Shari'a, Islamic sacred law derived from divine inspiration,"
offers protection of an accused's privilege against self-incrimination
apparently more expansive than even the per se exclusions of Miranda.
Under the Shari'a, an accused has an absolute right to remain silent and
is never placed under oath.' 95 Generally, confessions or incriminating
statements obtained through coercion, trickery, or torture are not admitted
in evidence,196 although some Islamic jurists would disagree."9
Russian privilege against self-incrimination can be found in Natan Sharansky's political
biography. NATAN SHARANSKY, FEAR No Evu. 3-228 (1988).
192. Law on Criminal Procedure art. 64, cited in INGRAHAM, supra note 14, at 81
(emphasis in original).
193. Law on Criminal Procedure art. 32. The import of this article is apparently
honored more in the breach, as the events of 1989 in Tiananmen Square sadly
demonstrated.
194. The Shari'a, literally "the way" or the "straight path," is composed of the
Koran, the words and acts of the Prophet Mohammed (the hadith), traditional pre-Islamic
law, and, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the country, a kind of common law
composed of analogy and scholarly consensus.
The only major jurisdiction still adhering to a relatively pure form of Shari'a is
Saudi Arabia. Islamic criminal law, as embodied within the Shari'a, is applied in Iran,
the Sudan, Afghanistan, Oman, and Yemen. SAYED H. AMIN, ISLAMIC LAW IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 21 (1985).
195. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, ED., THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 106
(1981).
196. Id. at 106. See also Richter H. Moore, Jr., Courts, Law, Justice, and Criminal
Trials in Saudi Arabia, 11 INT'L I. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 61, 66 (1984).
197. There is some reference in the Koran to incidents where the Prophet utilized
trickery to extract criminal confessions from a few hapless followers. BASSIOUNI, supra
note 195, at 107.
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The Shari'a is quite specific concerning the requirements for
admissibility at trial of a confession by the accused. First, the confession
must be a product of the accused's "free and conscious will;" judges are
not permitted to encourage confessions. Second, the confession must be
unequivocal, with explicit details of the crime included. 98 Third, the
confession must be made in a judicial forum, not in police custody. 199
Fourth, the confession must be corroborated by other evidence or
circumstances. 2" Finally, the confession must be repeated before a
judicial tribunal a number of times equal to the number of witnesses who
would be required to convict the accused in the absence of his
confession.201
Confessions are admitted at trial, if made in accordance with the
above criteria, but the confession can only implicate the confessor, not any
co-defendants or accomplices.20 2 The confession is only admissible,
however, if the accused confesses to all elements of a crime. If this
requirement is not met, the confession will not be considered in any
way.20 3 The accused is also afforded an unlimited right to retract a
confession, literally right up to the time the axe falls. 2°
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 119-20.
201. Id. (e.g., four witnesses are needed to convict for adultery, one for defamation).
This requirement for multiple confessions applies only to hudud crimes (those crimes
specifically detailed in the Koran) and is related to the quest for nearly absolute assurance
of guilt before a hudud punishment is meted out. Moore, supra note 196, at 65. The
most notorious hudud crimes and punishments are amputation for theft and stoning for
adultery. There are only seven hudud crimes.
The Shari'a does provide incentives for self-incrimination by offering an offender
complete forbearance of punishment if he comes forward, confesses, and repents his crime
before he is apprehended or formally accused. Sam H. Souryal, The Role of the Shari'a
Law in Determining Criminality in Saudi Arabia, 12 INT'L J. CoMp. & APPLIED CRIM.
JUST. 1, 5 (1985). For a detailed description of the accused's procedural rights under
Saudi criminal law, see Jeffrey K. Walker, The Rights of the Accused in Saudi Criminal
Procedure, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 863 (1993).
202. BASSIOUNI, supra note 195, at 120 (noting that a man's confession to adultery
would not impugn guilt to his nonmarital female partner).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 120. If the accused retracts his confession after sentencing, punishment
is immediately suspended and the matter is either retried or dismissed. Moore, supra note
196, at 65.
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B. Ethiopia
Prior to the overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1974, Ethiopian law was
largely based on the customary law of the Coptic Christian majority.
Concerning self-incrimination, the Ethiopian criminal law generally
compelled an accused to forego silence.20 5 This was largely due to a
blurring of the boundaries between what European law views as criminal
and civil litigation. The prosecution of a crime was carried out by an
accuser, who may or may not have been the victim. The accuser was
permitted to call witnesses, whereas the accused was only able to refute
their testimony through his own testimony.' Absent proof of guilt, the
accuser was allowed to request a decisory oath, heavily steeped in Coptic
Christian tradition.
20 7
Another traditional truth-finding procedure resulted in compulsion of
a guilty accused to convict himself from his own mouth. In the affersata,
the entire community where the crime occurred would be sequestered,
with no one allowed to leave or, in some instances eat, until the guilty
party was offered up for trial.20 8
VII. INSURING THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION:
A COMPARATwE VIEW
A case may be made questioning whether any right to silence,
qualified or unlimited, is really in the best interest of either a Due Process
or Crime Control view of criminal justice.2' Since nearly every major
legal system recognizes some form of the privilege, one may assume that
it is here to stay for the foreseeable future. But how we justify the
privilege may not at all dovetail with what we expect the privilege to do
for us as a society, and the experiences of some foreign jurisdictions may
lend insight into our own treatment of the privilege.
205. Stanley Z. Fisher, Traditional Criminal Procedure in Ethiopia, 19 AM. I. CRIM.
L. 709, 716-725 (1971).
206. Id. at 724-28.
207. Id. at 730.
208. An accused may have preferred the affersata over some of the other forms of
truth-determination: divination, ordeal, and a form of curse authorized by the Coptic
Church. Id. at 734-39.
209. See, e.g., David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1963 (1986).
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The fundamental analytical conundrum we face in borrowing from
other jurisdictions, aside from questions of cultural specificity, is that the
American criminal justice system apparently does not really know what it
wants from the privilege against of self-incrimination. Returning to
Packer's Crime Control and Due Process models, it is perhaps apparent
that Miranda was designed as another hurdle in the Due Process obstacle
course. Indeed, the majority opinion in Miranda is replete with references
to the individual's "right to a private enclave,"21° to buffering "the
circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation,"2 11 or to shifting to the
government the burden "to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination. "212
Since the earliest days of Miranda, there has been a steady erosion to
the procedural protections of the per se exclusionary rule.2 ' Regardless
of the original intent of the Warren Court, Miranda has not lived up to its
initial promise.
What may very well have happened to Miranda is a kind of untoward
transformation into a device for getting just as many coerced incriminating
statements into court as were admitted under the antecedent voluntariness
standard. Thus, the per se rule may have, like the serpent eating its own
tail, turned upon itself. This has occurred in two ways. First, if the
environment of the custodial interrogation is, as the Miranda majority
would assert, inherently coercive, all that has effectively been done is to
ratchet up the level of coercion one notch. Instead of statements being
coerced (and then justified in evidence under a voluntariness standard), a
waiver of rights becomes the coerced element, with all subsequent
(coerced or otherwise) incriminating statements admitted under the per se
rule. The likelihood of such a paradoxical result is only increased by the
almost mantra-like quality taken on by the recitation of Miranda rights;
210. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (quoting United States v.
Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (1956) (Frank, J., dissenting)).
211. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470.
212. Id. at 475 (quoting Escobedo v. Illiniois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964)).
213. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that Miranda-
defective statements could be admitted to impeach defendant's testimony); Jenkins v.
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (holding that prearrest silence may be used for
impeachment purposes); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (adopting a "good
faith" exception to per se exclusion after incomplete Miranda warnings). But see Edwards
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that statements resulting from subsequent
questioning without presence of counsel after defendant had asserted right to counsel were
per se inadmissible).
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surely there are few American teenagers, steeped in the cops-and-robbers
culture of American television, who could not rattle off a Miranda
warning on demand. For police, the warnings have become a formality
of interrogation, mere form rather than substance. 21 4 Second, as Justice
Harlan pointed out in his Miranda dissent, 5 the per se exclusionary rule
does absolutely nothing to curtail the actions of unscrupulous police
officers who would have dissembled concerning voluntariness under the
old test. If anything, Miranda makes the dishonest cop's job easier: now
he would only have to fabricate a waiver of rights, rather than concoct
some convincing indicia of voluntariness.
What comes of this divergence between the theory and practice of
Miranda? It may have, since 1967, become an unwitting yet effective
weapon in the Crime Control model arsenal. If, as Packer states, the
purely distilled essence of the Crime Control model is a two-step
procedure of early culling of innocent persons followed by a guilty plea,
then Miranda may go a long way in assisting with the second step. The
cost of this assistance may, however, be borne largely by the first step.
What then can be learned, borrowed, and applied from foreign
jurisdictions concerning the privilege against self-incrimination? Again,
we must first define the vantage point at which we view the privilege.
A. Miranda as a Tool of the Due Process Model?
If our goal is to strengthen the Due Process model through staunch
protections of the right to silence, then the United States would stand
something like this in relation to the rest of the world, assuming that the
214. The very police interrogation manual that so outraged the Miranda majority has
not been rendered obsolete. Instead, the authors have simply added a new section on
dealing with a suspect's Miranda rights as a stumbling block to effective interrogation.
FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSION (2d ed.
1967). Studies in the United States have shown that confessions were seen by police and
prosecutors as necessary for convictions in anywhere from 12-21 % of cases. New Haven
Project, supra note 49, at 1519-1648; Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr.,
29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 1-26 (1967). Compare this to England, where admissible
confessions are presumably easier to come by under the voluntariness standard and the
nonbinding Judges' Rules: a recent study by the British section of the International
Commission of Jurists reports that if all custodial confessions were excluded from
evidence, only about 6 % of convictions would be affected. Horsnell, Police Malpractices
'Made Impossible Under Today's Laws,' THE TIMES (London), Oct. 21, 1989, §1, at 2.
215. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The extremes, Ethiopia and Japan (Crime Control) and India and the
Shari'a (Due Process), only rest at the poles when viewed through
Western eyes. 21 6 Ethiopia (that is, pre-revolutionary Ethiopia, as discussed
supra) represents the most Crime Control-oriented view of self-
incrimination for two reasons. First, a defendant must speak at trial, since
he is not permitted to call any witnesses on his own behalf; any refutation
of the case against him must be from his own mouth.
Second, the system of affersata places extremely coercive,
community-wide pressure upon an individual, guilty or otherwise, to admit
responsibility for a crime. Japan is listed close to Ethiopia because,
although maintaining Western-imposed constitutional guarantees against
self-incrimination, both practice and historical precedents show a quite
marked disdain among law enforcement officials for the privilege.
The Islamic Shari'a rests at the opposite extreme. The Shari'a
maintains a complete exclusion of extra-judicial statements, adding more
Due Process obstacles through elaborate procedures for both making and
216. It may be an almost cavalier overgeneralization to place these various systems
along a Western, adversarial continuum with no regard to the specific cultural milieu of
each. This said, the intent is to see what Americans may borrow from other systems; so
perhaps the imposition of an admittedly American ethnocentric interpretive model is not
entirely without merit.
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refuting confessions as well as bars to incrimination of co-defendants
resulting from a confession.
In the center lies the familiar groupings of the civil and common law
countries. The civilian jurisdictions lie toward the Crime Control end of
the continuum for the simple reason that they share the general
characteristic of guaranteeing an absolute right to silence, but exerting a
kind of de facto compulsion for the defendant to testify through the civil
law's preference for a free evaluation of evidence coupled with expansive
relevancy criteria. What separates the civil law jurisdictions tends to be
specific procedural idiosyncrasies, such as the amount of time a suspect
may be held incommunicado2 7 or when and of what rights a suspect must
be advised during the investigative process. 21 '8 Likewise, the common law
jurisdictions lie closer to the Due Process end than the civilians simply
because the adversarial system, by its general nature, places many more
obstacles between the suspect, the state, and the successful resolution of
the criminal process (i.e., elaborate rules of admissibility, relevancy, and
hearsay). The common law jurisdictions, too, are separated by specific
procedural quirks much like those separating the civilians.2"9
And what of the United States under an effective Miranda regime?
Although apparently pure Due Process, that would be a too-hasty
generalization. The problem with Miranda, even if applied in exactly the
manner foreseen by the majority, is that it does not define just what it is
about. The majority opinion blurs the distinction between prevention of
police coercion and preclusion of self-incriminating statements as evidence,
thereby wallowing in a kind of jurisprudential schizophrenia. It is quite
217. For example, the Germans only allow a suspect to be held overnight, a
maximum of something less than 24 hours. The French can detain a suspect for up to 48
hours, depending on the circumstances.
218. For example, the Germans require that a suspect be informed almost
immediately of the charges under investigation, his right to silence, and his right to
counsel. The Dutch, on the other hand, purposefully refrain from advising a suspect of
his rights, lest the knowledge somehow interfere with the fact-finding process. The
Norwegians inform suspects that their silence, not their statements, may be used against
them at trial.
219. The placement of England and Canada is really a bit of a coin toss, but Canada
belongs more toward the Due Process pole because of the Charter of Rights and the
Canadian Supreme Court's power of judicial review. Although not yet clear what long-
term effects these two factors will have, they represent the structural makings of some
possibly significant future movement. Scotland is placed to the right of Canada and
England because of the peculiar burden placed on the Crown in criminal prosecutions, as
well as the Scots' traditional distrust of all law enforcement institutions.
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possible that the Miranda majority sought both, and if so the method
chosen was less than satisfactory. If the aim is to prevent coercion by law
enforcement officials, then something may be learned from the
jurisdictions left of the tentative United States position. The express intent
of England and Canada is to prevent coercive methods by the police. Both
countries apply a voluntariness standard for incriminating statements,
scrutinizing the specific circumstances surrounding the statements. In the
United States, applying this standard would return us to the pre-Miranda
due process voluntariness approach; no doubt much to the satisfaction of
the Miranda dissenters. On the other hand, if the aim is to prevent
suspects from convicting themselves from their own mouths, an
eventuality philosophically anathema to adversarial criminal justice, then
the methods of those to the right of the United States, such as the Shari'a,
may instruct us. If we are truly dedicated to adversarial criminal justice,
then the logical extension of this dedication would lead us to something
like the Islamic system of complete exclusion of all non-judicial statements
coupled with an absolute right to withdraw a confession at any time during
the judicial process.
B. Miranda as a Tool of the Crime Control Model?
Miranda in theory and Miranda in practice have turned out to be quite
the opposite. The actual position of the United States along the self-
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What has happened in practice is that the U.S. treatment of the
privilege against self-incrimination has slid to the left. This is the result
of two factors. First, by discarding the due process voluntariness
standard, courts no longer consider the circumstances surrounding an
incriminating statement, only whether the defendant was advised of his
rights and made a knowing waiver. Second, by imbuing the recitation and
waiver of rights with a kind of magical quality, the American courts have
eviscerated the Miranda per se exclusionary rule. Whereas only clever
dishonest police could get by the voluntariness standard, stupid dishonest
police can circumvent by Miranda by asserting a believable waiver. A
further factor pushing the U.S. farther left along the continuum is the
increasing reliance of the American criminal justice system on the
bargained guilty plea. Such a plea is, by its very nature, the ultimate self-
incriminating statement. American courts, unlike their civilian sister
jurisdictions, accept guilty pleas without any investigation into its veracity;
truth, in essence, is not the issue.
Viewed in this light, the United States would rest somewhere near
France on the continuum. Although maintaining, like the civilian
jurisdictions, an absolute right to silence, the United States does not have
direct remedial mechanisms to correct police abuses, as do the French.
The acceptance of bargained-for guilty pleas without any inquiry reinforces
the position of the United States to the left of both France and Germany.
This seemingly inexorable leftward drift along the Crime Control-Due
Process continuum halts well right of Japan, since the United States
requires a thorough rights advisory, does not allow a suspect to be warned
against remaining silent, and harbors a traditional Lockean emphasis on
the autonomy of the individual vis d vis the state. It almost appears that
the American judicial system, regardless of the supposed constraints of
Miranda, would be hard pressed to proceed any further toward a more
Crime Control-oriented view of self-incrimination and still remain within
even a very broad reading of the Constitution.
What the United States might learn, absorb, and borrow from other
jurisdictions is always circumscribed to a greater or lesser extent, by the
constraints of the Bill of Rights. The most salient feature of these
constraints, at least in the context of self-incrimination, is the Fifth
Amendment. Oddly, all Western criminal justice systems have a similar
guarantee against being "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." In Germany, France, and their progeny, a trial begins
with an examination of the accused, but at no time is the accused's right
to silence questioned; he may refuse to answer any and all inquiries.
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Some systems allow the prosecution to comment on this silence, others do
not.
A second oddity of the presumed constitutional constraints on
tinkering with self-incrimination is that some of the procedural devices that
most discourage a defendant's participation in his own trial are found
nowhere in the text of the Constitution. The requirement that a defendant
testify under oath or not at all is not a constitutional requirement. Nor is
the attendant crime of criminal perjury. Although coming to us on faded
parchment through the common law, both the effectiveness and necessity
of oath-taking is seriously in question today. Judge Frankel would likely
agree; this is just another procedural hulk in the course of truth-finding.
Finally, there is no mention of the phrase adversarial system of
criminal justice anywhere within the text of the Constitution. Many would
argue that adversarial criminal justice is implicitly written between the
lines of the Bill of Rights. Others could argue that, aligning themselves
with Thomas Jefferson's view that constitutions should perhaps be
rewritten each generation, the great strength of the United States
Constitution lies in its flexibility in the face of changing circumstances, its
uncanny ability to expand without snapping. Although an accused must,
under the Sixth Amendment, be confronted by all witnesses against him,
this does not necessitate set piece examination and cross-examination by
wholly partisan counsel. Although juries are made the supreme trier of
fact by the Seventh Amendment, there is no reason that juries must be
given free reign to nullify substantive law rather than be asked to respond
to interrogatories of fact.
The perceived superiority of the adversarial system may be the most
widely held and, at the same time, least logically persuasive justification
for the preservation of the traditional devices surrounding the privilege
against self-incrimination. This argument, however, is really mere
tautology. Like Edmund Burke's defense of the 18th century English
constitution, 220 saying something is best because it is what history, through
design or happenstance, has saddled us with, is wholly unpersuasive. This
assertion is belied by the fact that the vast majority of the industrialized
world's population gets by (and apparently quite well) under some
amended version of an inquisitorial system of criminal justice.
220. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION [N FRANCE (1790).
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